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Abstract
This paper analyzes capital structure in South Korea from 1991 until 1999. The paper
makes use of quantile regression methods to explore the changing distribution of
debt-capital ratios across firms and over time. We find clear evidence of
heterogeneity in the capital structure of firms. There is also strong evidence of
heterogeneity in the determinants of capital structure choice. The size of the firm and
its rate of growth have a positive impact on debt at low values of the debt ratios, but a
negative impact at high values of the ratios. By contrast, the proportion of net fixed
assets has a negligible impact at low values of the debt ratios, but a significantly
positive impact at medium or high values of the ratios. The observed non-linearities in
the determinants of capital structure are consistent with an agency cost theory of
capital structure, and with both a non-negativity constraint and an upper bound on
debt.
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1. Introduction
The central question of corporate finance, ‘what determines firms’ choice of capital
structure?’, has, since the crises of 1997, acquired new significance in the context of
developing economies. The debt ratios of South Korean firms in particular have been
a focus for attention since the high leverage ratios of Korean firms is believed to have
had a role in the evolution of that country’s crisis.
Studies of firms’ capital structure in the context of asymmetric information and
market imperfections have a theoretical rationale for treating firms’ choice of debt-
equity ratio as determined by agency costs (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Proxies for those
arguments have been found to have a significant relationship with capital structure in
US data (Titman and Wessels, 1988) and similar proxies have been significant in
explaining  the  differences  in  firms’  capital  structure  among  the  advanced
industrialized countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Recently empirical studies similar
to those of US firms have been concerned with the capital structure of firms in
developing countries, mainly Latin American and South East Asian companies (Booth
et al, 2001).
Studies attempting to explain the capital structure of firms in developing countries
have special value to the extent that the 1997 East Asian crisis and subsequent sharp
declines in the region’s investment and growth were due to the high debt ratio of East
Asian firms at the start of the crisis (Kim and Stone, 1999; Harvey and Roper, 1999).
While some identify high leverage as the principal factor, others locate the underlying
cause of the crisis in deteriorating fundamentals with high leverage ratios having the
important effect of linking fundamentals to the financial markets in a negative
feedback (Harris, 2000). Although high leverage characterised all the East Asian crisis
economies, in South Korea the effect of leverage was in some ways distinct, at least in
that firms’ leverage was reflected in equity valuation (Pomerleano and Zhang, 1999).
Nevertheless Korean firms’ high leverage has been identified as the main factor
responsible for the Korean crisis and its depth (Lee, et al 1999; Classens et al, 1998).
High and increasing debt ratios that accompanied Korean firms’ growth in the 1980s
and 1990s, particularly reliance on foreign debt, caused them to be highly vulnerable
to deteriorating fundamentals and financial market shocks such as those of 1997.
Their high leverage also prevented Korean firms from adjusting rapidly to the
recession and credit crunch that followed the crisis, thereby intensifying its severity
and slowing the pace of recovery. Consequently, reducing the reliance of firms on
debt has become a central element of Korea’s restructuring programme in the post-
crisis period and studies of how Korean non-financial firms choose their capital
structure have significance for that (Lee et al, 1999; Hahm et al, 1998).2
Interestingly, empirical studies indicate that the determinants of capital structure
suggested by conventional capital structure models and well established in US studies
— a firm’s size, profitability, asset tangibility and growth prospects — also explain
the debt structure of Korean firms (Lee et al, 1999; Booth et al, 2000). Lee at al
(1999) find that, additionally, Korean institutional features have an effect. Controlling
for the other determinants, the capital structures of chaebol and non-chaebol firms
differ significantly which may be explained by institutional factors, namely the heavy
involvement of government in the pricing and allocation of credit, lack of appropriate
risk control and credit assessment techniques, and the close relationship between
chaebols and financial institutions.
This paper has two main related objectives. The first is to provide a detailed analysis
of the evolution of capital structure of Korean firms prior to the 1997 crisis. We use
quantile analysis to explore the changing distribution of debt ratios across firms and
over time. This analysis provides new insights into the causes of the Korean crisis.
Many studies of the origins of the Korean crisis argue that the Korean corporate sector
suffered from very low profitability and experienced sharp rises in their debt-equity
ratio during the period 1991-1997 (Pomerleano, 1998; Classens et al, 1998). This
increased  the  fragility  of  the  corporate  sector  and  made  the  economy  highly
vulnerable to speculative attacks and to a reversal of foreign capital flows. These
studies have drawn their conclusions from the mean values of profitability and
leverage. The quantile analysis, however, reveals a clear evidence of heterogeneity in
the capital structure of firms, the implications of which are obscured by inferences
from variables’ means. We show that contrary to existing evidence, most Korean
firms achieved positive and relatively high profit margins and indeed were able to
maintain stable profit margins prior to and during the crisis. Furthermore, although the
mean leverage of Korean firms increased during the 1991-1998 period, this rise was
caused by the steep increases in leverage in the very upper parts of the distribution.
This analysis has important policy implications. It shows that the weaknesses in the
Korean corporate sector prior to the crisis were not wide-ranging. However, the
heightened fragility of a small number of firms was enough to convey bad signals to
foreign  investors  and  induce  a  swing  to  pessimism  about  the  economy  that
precipitated a generalized crisis.
The second objective of the paper is to analyse the determinants of the capital
structure choice of Korean firms using conditional quantile regression methods. This
approach, which is more information rich than least squares, takes into account the
heterogeneity in the capital structure of firms, the large variation in the leverage ratios
across Korean firms. Since the change in the mean of the leverage of Korean firms is
determined by a few observations in the upper parts of the distribution, classical
empirical methods based on the estimation of the conditional mean are inaccurate in
explaining the capital structure of Korean firms. Due to heterogeneity, the leverage3
ratio may not be identically distributed across firms in which case we may expect to
find significant differences in the impact of the determinants of the capital structure
choice. Quantile regression allows us to examine the whole distribution of firms rather
than a single measure of the central tendency of the capital structure distribution.
Consequently we are able to evaluate the relative importance of explanatory variables
at different points of the distribution of firms’ leverage.
Our results show that there is strong evidence of heterogeneity in the determinants of
capital structure choice. The size of the firm and its rate of growth have a positive
impact on debt at low values of the debt ratios, but a negative impact at high values of
the ratios. By contrast, the proportion of net fixed assets has a negligible impact at low
values of the debt ratios, but a significantly positive impact at medium or high values
of the ratios. The observed non-linearities in the determinants of capital structure are
consistent with an agency cost theory of capital structure, in a model that includes
both a non-negativity constraint and an upper bound on the debt-equity ratio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the debt structure
and profitability of Korean firms during the 1991-1999 period. Section 3 presents an
agency cost theory of capital structure, with both a non-negativity constraint and an
upper bound on the debt ratio, which allows for non-linearities in the determinants of
capital structure. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical methodology while
Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the results and
concludes.
2. Capital structure in South Korea
Heavy reliance on debt finance, mainly from the domestic banking system, was a
major feature of the Asian miracle and is reflected in the high leverage of East Asian
firms. During the 1988-1996 period, Korean firms had the highest leverage and
highest growth of leverage ratios as measured by the mean of the leverage ratios of
listed Korean firms (Classens et al, 1998; Lee et al, 1999). However, there was large
variation across Korean firms in the evolution and the level of their leverage as well
as  in  their  economic  performance.  As  such,  it  may  not  be  accurate  to  draw
conclusions based on mean values. In order to explore the capital structure and
performance of Korean firms, we examine the entire distribution of short-term and
long-term leverage. The data used in this section consist of selected variables from the
balance sheets of Korean firms listed on the Korea Stock exchange over the period
1991-1999. The source of the data is Datastream.
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1  Precise definitions of these firm related variables are given in the appendix.4
Figure 1 depicts total debt-to-capital ratio over the period 1991-1999 at various
quantiles of the distribution.
2 As can be seen from this figure, the mean debt-to-capital
ratio increased significantly during the period 1991-1998. However, the figure also
shows that the increase in the mean debt-to-capital ratio has been mainly driven by the
upper quantiles of the distribution where firms in these quantiles experienced very
steep increases in their debt to capital ratios, especially in 1997. In fact, Figure 1
shows that very little increase in the debt-to-capital ratio occurred at the lower
quantiles of the distribution. For example, for firms in the 10
th quantile, the debt-to-
capital ratio increased very little from 26% in 1991 to 33% in 1997 and then declined
to  21%  in  1998.  By  comparison,  the  debt-to-capital  ratio  for  the  95
th  quantile
increased from 142% in 1991 to 286% in 1997 to decline slightly to 271% in 1998.
Note also that the median of the debt capital ratio is consistently below the mean,
indicating that the debt to capital distribution is right-skewed, and more so in later
years.
3 Figure 2, which depicts the ratio of short-term debt to total capital employed,
shows the same pattern. Although the mean of the short-term debt-to-capital ratio
increased during the 1991-1998 period, this rise was mainly attributable to the steep
increases  in  the  short-term  debt-to-capital  ratio  in  the  upper  quantiles  of  the
distribution. By contrast, not much increase in the short-term debt-to-capital ratio
occurred in the lower parts of the distribution.
Figure 3 depicts the operating profit margin during 1991-1999 at various quantiles of
the distribution. The main advantage of this as a measure of profit is that it is not
influenced by the liability structure of the firm as it excludes interest payments on the
debt, financial income, and other income and expenses. As can be seen from this
figure, there are major differences in the change in the operating profit margin across
quantiles. While firms in the lower quantiles achieved negative profit margins and
witnessed a steady and steep decline in their operating profit margins especially
during the period 1996-1998, firms in the upper quantile achieved positive and
relatively high operating profit margins. More importantly, the figure shows that the
operating profit margins for firms in the upper quantiles did not witness any decline,
but instead remained relatively stable during the period under study. Note also that at
the end of the sample period, the median of operating profit margin remained
                                                   
2  The choice of debt-to-capital ratio (which is equivalent to debt to total assets), instead of debt to
equity ratio, is driven by the fact that many firms in our sample have small or even negative equity.
This is especially true in later years of our sample when equity values fell dramatically as a result of
the crisis, inflating the debt to equity ratios.
3  Note that in figures 1 and 2, the distance between the quantiles widened in the upper segments of the
distribution while became narrower in the lower segments of the distribution. This indicates that the
distribution has become more skewed towards high leverage over the sample period. This could
have led to heightened financial fragility (see Bernanke et al, 1988).5
consistently  above  the  mean,  indicating  a  shift  in  the  operating  profit  margin
distribution in later years. Thus while studies of average performance show that the
Korean economy suffered from low profitability and low rate of return on assets
before the crisis, analysis of the distribution shows that many Korean firms achieved
positive and relatively high profit margins and indeed were able to maintain stable
profit margins prior to and during the crisis.
In Table 1, we compare the characteristics of the firms in the 95
th quantile of the short-
term leverage distribution with other firms in the sample for 1997.
4 If firms in the
upper quantile were also the largest, it could be argued that their leverage would
outweigh the remaining firms in the sample. According to this table, however, the
firms in the 95
th quantile are, on average, smaller in size. This is true whether we use
the number of employees or total capital employed as proxies for size. This indicates
that it is not necessarily true that the largest firms are also the most highly leveraged
ones, as some studies suggest. Table 1 also shows that, on average, these highly
leveraged firms have significantly lower operating profit margins, lower return on
capital employed, lower net fixed assets and higher proportion of short-term debt to
total debt. Table 2, which compares the firms in the 90
th quantile to the rest of firms in
the sample, suggests similar conclusions.
Thus, examination of the distribution of data shows that before and after the crisis of
1997 there were large differences in the level and the evolution of debt structure and
performance  across  Korean  firms.  This  heterogeneity  in  our  sample  warrants
examination of the whole distribution of leverage rather than focus on a single central
tendency  measure.  Given  the  heterogeneity  of  firms,  we  would  expect  the
determinants of leverage to have a different impact depending on the firm’s degree of
leverage. In the next section, we present a simple model that allows for a differential
impact of determinants on leverage.
3. Determinants of capital structure
The theoretical literature on capital structure suggests a number of considerations to
account for the debt-equity ratio chosen by corporations based on the agency cost of
debt and equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1991). Agency costs
of debt are borne by firm owners because of the potential conflicts between debt
holders and equity holders and between equity holders and managers of the firm. This
theoretical literature has testable implications regarding the determinants of leverage.
One such implication is the relationship between free cash flow and firm leverage.
According to agency cost theory free cash flow increases managers’ power relative to
                                                   
4  We report the results for 1997 only, but the same pattern is observed in other years.6
principals’ and debt can be an effective instrument to reduce the cash flow available
for discretionary spending by managers (Jensen, 1986). The main testable implication
is that we should observe a direct relationship between internal funds and a firm’s
leverage.
Another testable implication is the relationship between leverage and a firm’s growth
opportunities. First, firms with a high proportion of non-collateralisable assets (such
as growth opportunities) could find it more expensive to obtain credit because of the
asset substitution effect (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Similarly, firms in growing
industries may have greater flexibility in their choice of investments, allowing equity
holders to capture wealth from bondholders. Either way, firms with important growth
opportunities are likely to face high agency costs of debt and hence are likely to rely
more on equity funds. By contrast, firms with high collateralisable assets (proxied by
measures of tangible assets) could face lower costs of debt. First, the presence of
collateralisable assets reduces the scope for asset substitution (Titman and Wessels,
1988). Second, firms with higher liquidation value (e.g. with more tangible assets)
will  have  higher  debt  since  higher  liquidation  value  make  it  more  likely  that
liquidation would be the best strategy (Harris and Raviv 1991). As a consequence,
firms with higher collateralisable assets are likely to exhibit higher debt-equity ratios.
5
Another potential determinant of capital structure is the size of the firmLarger firms
could have easier access to capital markets and borrow at more favourable interest
rates (Ferri and Jones, 1979) perhaps because larger firms are more diversified in their
investments and operationsand therefore have a lower risk of default (Titman and
Wessels, 1988). These arguments suggest a positive relationship between firm size
and leverage.
The above considerations can be incorporated into a formal model of maximization of
the firm’s value. The objective function for the firm can be written as:
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5  Tangible assets can also serve as collateral against external loans. Due to imperfect information
regarding the behaviour of firms, those with little tangible assets may find it difficult to raise funds
via debt financing (Scott, 1977). By contrast, growth opportunities can be thought of as real options.
Given the agency costs associated with these options, it is more difficult for a firm to borrow against
them than against tangible fixed assets (Myers, 1977).7
where Kt and Lt are capital and labor respectively, Bt is the stock of debt, p
k
tIt is
nominal investment, pt is output price, wt is the wage rate, rt is the interest rate on
debt, and F(Kt, Lt) is the production function.
6 The function  ) ; ( 1 x − t B A  measures the
costs of finance to the firm in terms of foregone output. The vector x includes a set of
variables that influence the agency cost of debt, such as net fixed assets, the rate of
growth of the firm or its operating profits.
7 The function  ) ; ( 1 x − t B A  thus captures the
agency effects we have discussed. We shall assume that AB > 0 and ABB > 0: the
marginal cost of debt is positive and increasing in the stock of debt.
The maximization program for the firm is also subject to the dynamic equation on
capital stock, a non-negativity constraint on debt and an upper bound on the total
stock of debt:
8
(3) KK I tt t =− + − () 1 1 δ
(4) Bt ≥ 0, BH t ≤
The first-order condition on the stock of debt at time t is:
(5) µµ β β Bt Ht t t B t rA ,, () −= + + − ++ 11 1
where µ B,t and µ H,t are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the non-negativity
constraint  and  with  the  upper  bound  on  debt  respectively.  Furthermore,  the
complementary slackness conditions yield:
(6) µ Bt t B , ⋅= 0
(7) µ Ht t HB , ⋅− ( ) = 0
In order to interpret these conditions, note that, when neither constraint is binding, the
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers µ B,t and µ H,t are both equal to zero and the first-order
condition (5) becomes:
(8) ββ tt B t rA ++ ++= 11 1 ()
The comparative static effect on debt of a change in a variable x∈ x is given by:
dB
dx
A
A
Bx
BB
=−
which is positive when ABx < 0, that is, when an increase in x reduces the
marginal cost of debt.
                                                   
6  For simplicity, we ignore adjustment costs of capital.
7  See Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1996) for an early application of an agency cost function to
the objective function of the firm.
8  We abstract from the non-negativity constraints on dividends and on new equity issues since these
would be irrelevant for our analysis.8
When the lower constraint on debt is binding (and therefore the upper constraint is not
binding), µ B,t >0 and µ H,t = 0 and the first-order condition (5) becomes:
(10) µβ β Bt t t B t rA , () =+ + − ++ 11 1
The effect on the stock of debt of an increase in x∈ x is:
(11)
dB
dx
A
A
tB x B x
tB B B B
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−
−
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+
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1
1
We have already assumed that ABB > 0. In order to sign the direction of the effects of
changes of x on B, we assume that the following set of sufficient conditions holds.
Assumption 1.
i. ABx < 0: an increase in x reduces the marginal cost of debt;
ii. µ Bx < 0: an increase in x reduces the marginal cost of the non-
negativity constraint on debt;
iii. µ BB < 0: an increase in the stock of debt reduces the marginal cost of
the non-negativity constraint on debt; and
iv.| µ Bx| < β t+1 |ABx|: the effect of x on the marginal cost of the non-
negativity constraint is less, in absolute value, than its discounted
effect on the marginal agency cost of debt.
It is then straightforward to verify the following Proposition.
Proposition 1.
When µ B,t = µ H,t = 0 and when Assumption  1 holds, we have that dB/dx > 0: an
increase in x is associated with an increase in debt.
When the upper constraint on debt is binding (and therefore the non-negativity
constraint is not binding), the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers are such that µ B,t = 0 and µ H,t >
0, and therefore the first-order condition (5) becomes:
(12) µβ β Ht t t t B rA , () =− + + ++ 11 1
The effect of a variable x∈ x on B is given by:
(13)
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A
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We now make the following set of assumptions.
Assumption 2.
i. ABx < 0: an increase in x reduces the marginal cost of debt;
ii. µ Hx < 0: an increase in x reduces the marginal cost of the upper
constraint on debt;9
iii. µ HB > 0: an increase in the stock of debt increases the marginal cost
of the upper constraint on debt;
iv µ HB > β t+1 ABB: as the stock of debt B increases, its effect on the
marginal cost of the upper constraint on debt exceeds its effect on
the discounted value of the marginal agency cost of debt; and
v β t+1 |ABx| < |µ Hx|: the effect of x on the discounted marginal cost of
debt  is  less  than  its  effect  on  the  marginal  cost  of  the  upper
constraint.
Proposition 2.
When µ B,t = 0 and µ H,t > 0 and when Assumption 2 holds, we have that dB/dx > 0: an
increase in x is associated with an increase in debt.
The  impact  of  x on B  is  instead  negative  when Assumption 2  is  replaced  by
Assumption 2’ below.
Assumptions 2'.
i - iv. as in Assumption 2; and
v. β t+1 |ABx| > |µ Hx|: the effect of x on the discounted marginal cost of
debt exceeds its effect on the marginal cost of the upper constraint.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 2'.
When µ B,t = 0 and µ H,t > 0 and when Assumptions 2' holds, we have that dB/dx < 0: an
increase in x is associated with a reduction in debt.
Comparing equation (9) with equations (11) and (13) shows that the determinants of
the optimal capital structure of firms will be different, depending on whether either
constraint (or neither) is binding. Hence, we should expect to find evidence of
structural changes in the parameters of the capital structure model, depending on the
leverage ratio.
4. Empirical Methodology and Data
We test the implications of our model using the conditional quantile regression
estimator developed by Koenker and Basset (1978). The quantile regression method
helps us to achieve the following two main objectives. First, conditional mean
regression estimators, namely least square regressions, concentrate only on a single
central tendency measure. Conditional quantile regression, on the other hand, traces
the entire distribution of leverage, conditional on a set of explanatory variables. An
overview of the distribution of firms at different levels of financial leverage can be a10
very informative descriptive device, especially when the data are heterogeneous. Due
to heterogeneity, the dependent variable may not be identically distributed across
firms in which case we expect to find significant differences in the estimated slope
parameters  at  different  quantiles.  As  our  theoretical  discussion  suggests,  the
determinants of capital structure will be different depending on whether the lower or
the upper constraint on the debt ratio is binding, or neither. Second, since our sample
contains large outliers and the distribution of the disturbances is non-normal, applying
conditional mean estimators to our equation is not suitable since these estimators are
not robust to departure from normality or long tail error situations and therefore are
likely to produce inefficient and biased estimates. This is in contrast to quantile
regression, which is robust to departures from normality and skewed tails (Mata and
Machado, 1996).
The Econometric Framework
In what follows, we summarize the conditional quantile regression technique. Let (yi ,
xi), i=1,…,n, be a sample from some population where x i is a (K× 1) vector of
regressors. Assuming that the θ th quantile of the conditional distribution of yi is linear
in xi, we can write the conditional quantile regression model as follows:
(14) yx u ii i = ′ + β θθ
and
(15) Quant y x y F y x x ii i i θθ θβ ( | ) inf{ : ( | ) } ≡≥ = ′
and
(16) Quant u x i i θθ (| ) = 0
where  Quant y x ii θ (|) denotes the θ th conditional quantile of yi, conditional on the
regressor vector xi, β θ  is the unknown vectors of parameters to be estimated for
different values of θ   in (0,1), uθ  is the error term which is assumed to have a
continuously differentiable c.d.f.,Fx uθ (.| ), and a density function  fx uθ (.| ), and Fi(.|x)
denotes the conditional distribution function. By varying the value of θ  from 0 to 1,
we can trace the entire distribution of y, conditional on x.
The estimator for β θ  is obtained from:
(17) min ( ) ρβ θθ
i
n
ii yx ∑ − ′
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The estimator does not have an explicit form, but the resulting minimization problem
can be solved by linear programming techniques (Koenker and Basset, 1978).
9
Two general approaches exist for the estimation of the covariance matrix of the
regression parameter vector. The first derives the asymptotic standard error of the
estimator while the second uses bootstrap methods to compute these standard errors
and construct confidence intervals.
10 In this paper, we employ the design matrix
bootstrap method to obtain estimates of the standard errors for the coefficients in
quantile regression (Buchinsky,  1995,  1998).  Based  on  a  Monte  Carlo  study,
Buchinsky  (1995)  recommends  the  use  of  this  method  as  it  performs  well  for
relatively small samples and is robust to changes of the bootstrap sample size relative
to the data sample size.
 11 More importantly, the design matrix bootstrap method is
valid under many forms of heterogeneity.
12 In addition to the design matrix bootstrap
method, we use the percentile method recommended by Koenker and Hallock (2000).
This method enables us to construct confidence intervals for each parameter in β θ ,
where the intervals are computed from the empirical distribution of the sample of the
bootstrapped  ˆ * β θ ’s.
13  Unlike  the  standard  asymptotic  confidence  intervals,  the
bootstrap percentile intervals will not generally be symmetric around the underlying
parameter estimate, which is highly useful when the true sampling distribution is not
symmetric. It is important to note that these bootstrap procedures can be extended to
deal with the joint distribution of various quantile regression estimators, allowing us
to test for the equality of slope parameters across various quantiles (Koenker and
Hallock, 2000).
                                                   
9  In this study, the minimisation problem is solved by the linear programming techniques suggested
by Amstrong, Frome and Kung (1979).
10  Although the literature is not definite as to the ‘best’ path to follow, this does not pose a serious
problem. As noted by Koenker and Hallock (2000), the differences between competing methods of
inference for quantile regression are very small in practice and are more robust than other forms of
inference in econometrics.
11  The design matrix bootstrap method amounts to sampling pairs ( * , * ) ,..., yx i n ii = 1 at random from
the original observations with replacement and re-computing the least square estimator  ˆ * β θ  for each
sample. Repeating this process B times yields a sample of B p-vectors whose sample covariance
matrix constitutes a valid estimator of the covariance matrix of the original estimator. The number of
bootstrap  replications  should  be  large  enough  to  guarantee  a  small  sample  variability  of  the
covariance matrix. In this paper, we use 1000 bootstrap replications to obtain the standard errors.
12  The design bootstrap matrix performs very well (better than the other methods considered in
Buchinsky’s paper) even when the errors are homoskedastic.
13  See Buchinsky (1998) for a detailed description of the percentile method.12
Empirical specification and data
Based on the theoretical discussion of section 3, we specify the following panel data
model:
(19) Quant y x x z w it it it t i θθ αβ γ δ (|) =+ ′ + ′ +
where yit is the dependent variable at quantile θ .  We use two measures of the
dependent variable: the ratio of short-term debt to total capital employed (STDCAP)
and the ratio of total debt to total capital employed (TDCAP). Data limitations confine
us to measure debt only in book value.
The xit vector includes determinants that vary across firms and time. Based on the
reasoning in Section 3 and others’ empirical findings, we focus on four determinants:
net fixed assets, size, profitability and growth.
14 In addition to these covariates, we use
industry dummies to control for industry effects. Each industry may have specific
features that affect the debt structure of firms in that industry. These may arise–among
other factors- from the different business environment of each industry, the degree of
competition in each product market and the skill composition of the industry’s
workforce. We classify the firms in the sample into 64 industry groups using the
business description reported in Datastream.  We  also  include  time  dummies  to
control for factors that have the same effect for all firms at a given point in time, but
vary across time. These time-specific effects include macroeconomic variables such
as the price level and risk-free competitive interest rates.
15
Profitability can influence the debt structure of firms by increasing the availability of
cash flows or internal funds. Consistent with the free cash flow model, we would
expect higher internal funds to be associated with a reduction in the marginal agency
cost of debt since this gives firms an incentive to increase debt (ABx< 0 in Assumption
2). However, for highly leveraged firms, the availability of internal funds induces
firms to move further away from the upper constraint and lower their optimal debt
ratio since this will reduce the opportunity cost of the upper constraint on debt (µ Hx<0
in Assumption 2). This effect is in line with the pecking order hypothesis which
suggests that firms prefer to rely on internal funds than on outside sources of finance
(Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, for highly leveraged firms, the impact
of  free  cash  flow  on  debt  could  be  negative  if  the  second  effect  dominates
(Proposition 2’). In line with the empirical literature, this paper uses the ratio of
                                                   
14  To avoid simultaneity, all explanatory variables (except for growth which is a forward looking
variable) are lagged once.
15  We also included depreciation to control for non-debt tax shield. This variable was not statistically
significant in any of the regressions and hence was dropped from the analysis.13
operating profits to total sales (also known as the operating profit margin) as a proxy
for profitability and the availability of free cash flow.
Based on the discussion of Section 3, we expect size to have a negative impact on the
agency cost of debt and therefore a positive impact on the observed debt ratio (ABx< 0
in Assumption 2). However, high leveraged firms would like to move away from the
upper constraint of debt by resorting to alternative source of finance e.g. raise equity
through the stock market (µ Hx<0 in Assumption 2). In this respect, larger firms are in a
better position to access alternative sources of finance. Thus, for highly leveraged
firms, the effect of size on the marginal cost of debt could be lower than its effect on
the  marginal  cost  of  the  upper  constraint  (condition  v’  in Assumption 2':  see
Proposition 2') resulting in a negative relationship between size and leverage. In our
empirical analysis, we use the log of the total capital employed as a proxy for the size
of the firm.
16
We also expect the ratio of net fixed assets to have a negative effect on the marginal
agency cost of debt and hence a positive impact on leverage. Our model suggests that
the impact of an increase in net fixed assets on leverage is likely to be higher for the
debt constrained firms than for intermediate and low debt firms because the increase
in net fixed assets does not only reduce the marginal cost of debt for the former firms,
but also relaxes their upper constraint on debt (equations 9 and 13).
By contrast, firms with important growth opportunities are likely to face high agency
costs of debt and hence are likely to have lower debt ratios. However, growth
opportunities could exhaust the pool of internal funds, pushing firms to increase their
debt ratio. This is especially true for low leveraged firms where the non-negativity
constraint becomes more binding and firms try to move away from this constraint by
increasing their debt. Thus, for low leveraged firms, we expect to find a positive or
insignificant relationship between growth opportunities and leverage due to the latter
effect. This pattern should mirror the effect of collateralisable assets, such as net fixed
assets, which are instead likely to be mostly critical for the high-leveraged firms. We
use the percentage change of sales year over year as a proxy for growth.
Data
All the data used are constructed from the balance sheet of Korean firms listed on the
Korean stock exchange. The data source for these variables is Datastream database.
Three types of firms are omitted from our sample: firms with negative debt to capital
                                                   
16  This measure is highly correlated with the number of employees (available only from 1995 onwards)
and hence serves as a good proxy for size. We also used the logarithm of sales as a proxy for size
and obtained very similar results.14
ratios, firms that operate in the financial sectors, and firms with less than three
consecutive  observations  over  the  period  1992-1999.  This  leaves  us  with  an
unbalanced sample of 576 firms and 4,256 observations.
5. Empirical Results
Equation 19 is estimated for different values of θ  which allows us to examine the
impact of explanatory variables at different points of the distribution of firms’
leverage. Specifically, we estimate the regressions at seven quantiles, namely 0.05,
0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, and 0.95 quantiles, using the same list of explanatory
variables for each of these quantiles. Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation
19 using the ratio of short-term debt to capital as the dependent variable while in
figures 4a-4d, we plot the estimated coefficients against the various quantiles and the
95%  confidence  interval,  constructed  using  the  percentile  method  with  1000
replications.
For  comparison  purposes,  table  3  also  reports  the  OLS  estimates.  The  only
statistically significant variable is the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets (NFA),
which attracts a positive coefficient. Size and operating profit margin (OPM) are
statistically insignificant whereas GROWTH is significant only at the 10% level. The
poor performance of OLS is expected given the heterogeneity of firms’ capital
structure.
The  estimation  of  conditional  quantile  regressions  allows  us  to  explore  the
determinants of the debt ratio more accurately. The expected different effects of the
explanatory variables at the different quantiles of the distribution are reflected in the
size, sign and significance of estimated coefficients on the different covariates.
Regarding the impact of size on the firm’s capital structure choice (SIZE), there is
large variation in the magnitude and sign of the estimated coefficients as we move up
the conditional distribution. Specifically, size enters significantly and with a positive
coefficient at the lower quantiles indicating that, at the lower quantiles, larger firms
tends to have higher debt ratios. However, there is flip in the sign of the estimated
coefficient at the 75
th, 90
th, and 95
th quantiles and the estimated coefficients become
much larger in absolute value, indicating that at high levels of short-term leverage,
large firms are likely to reduce their debt ratios and move further away from the upper
constraint. Figure 4a provides a graphical illustration of this pattern.
The impact of profitability on capital structure also differs across the conditional
distribution of firms’ short-term leverage. While OPM is negative and statistically
significant at the 95
th  quantile, this variable seems to have no influence on the
leverage choice of firms at the lower quantiles (see also Figure 4d). This may reflect
the fact that highly leveraged firms are likely to rely more on internal sources for their15
funding, especially since the cost of debt is likely to be very high for these firms in
relation to internal sources of finance.
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As to the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets (NFA), this is statistically insignificant
at the lowest quantiles, whereas this variable becomes significant at the 25
th quantile
onwards. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients increase in importance as we move
up the conditional distribution of firms’ short-term leverage. This result is consistent
with our theoretical model. The impact of an increase in net fixed assets on leverage is
likely to be higher for the debt constrained firms because the increase in net fixed
assets relaxes their upper constraint on debt. The role of net fixed assets for different
values of the leverage ratio is illustrated in Figure 4b.
GROWTH, which captures non-collateralisable assets, mirrors the behavior of NFA.
It enters significantly with a positive sign at the 5
th, 10
th, 25
th and 50
th, but becomes
insignificant at the upper quantiles of the distribution (see Figure 4c). This result
suggests that it may not be possible for highly leveraged firms to borrow against non-
collateralisable assets because of the high agency costs associated with these real
options (Myers, 1977). This is in contrast with tangible assets which can serve as
collateral against external loans.
Whether or not the independent variables exert a different impact on the dependent
variable at different points of the distribution can be examined formally by testing for
the equality of the estimated coefficients across quantiles. In table 4, we report the F-
tests and the associated p-values for the equality of quantile slope coefficients across
the various pairs of quantiles. These tests are based on the bootstrapped standard
errors using 200 replications.
18  As  noted  by  Koenker  and  Hallock (2000), the
bootstrap procedure can be extended to deal with joint distribution allowing us to
construct tests of equality of slope parameters across quantiles. The tests confirm the
visual inspection. The F-tests of equality reject the null hypothesis of homogenous
coefficients at the 1% significance level for almost all pairs of quantiles with the
exceptions of the 5
th and 10
th quantile, the 25
th and 50
th quantile and the 90
th and 95
th
quantile where we can’t reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are
equal across these pair of quantiles. For example, there is a statistically significant (p-
value=0.00)  difference  between  the  10
th  quantile  (the  lower  quantile  of  the
distribution) and the 90
th percentile (the upper quantile of the distribution). The same
conclusions can be drawn across the different tails of the distribution. These findings
                                                   
17  The F-tests reported in the last two columns of table 3 suggest that both the industry dummies and
time dummies are significant in explaining the capital structure choice of firms.
18  See Arias, Hallock, and Sosa-Escudero (2001) for a similar application.16
are consistent with our hypothesis that the impact of explanatory variable on leverage
varies as we move up the distribution.
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (19) using the ratio of total debt to
capital as a dependent variable. The results are similar to those of long-term debt
where the expected different impact of the explanatory variables at the different
quantiles of the distribution is also reflected in the size, sign and significance of
estimated coefficients. While the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets enters
positively and is statistically significant in all the quantiles considered, the estimated
coefficients on this variable become increasingly important as we move up the
distribution (see figure 5b). Specifically, the absolute magnitude of the estimated
coefficient increases monotonically from 0.22 for the 10
th quantile to 0.73 for the 95
th
quantile. As to the size of the firm, this variable enters significantly with a positive
coefficient for all quantiles except for the two highest quantiles where the estimated
coefficients  are  insignificant  at  the  conventional  levels.  As  to  the  impact  of
profitability on capital structure, there is large variation across the conditional
distribution of firms’ long-term leverage. While it is insignificant at the lowest
quantiles,  the  operating  profit  margin  enters  with  a  negative  and  statistically
significant coefficient, starting from the 50
th  quantile. On the other hand, growth
prospects of the firm seem to have only an impact at the lowest quantiles (see figures
5a-5d). The F-tests of equality reported in table 6 also reject the null hypothesis of
homogenous coefficients at the 1% significance level for almost all pairs of quantiles.
We next check whether our results are robust to the exclusion of the crisis period.
Table 7 reports the regression results for short-term leverage over the period 1992-
1997.
19 The results are very similar to those obtained previously. The ratio of net fixed
assets to total assets enters positively and is statistically significant in all the quantiles
considered and the estimated coefficients on this variable become increasingly
important as we move up the distribution. Specifically, the absolute magnitude of the
estimated coefficient increases monotonically from 0.07 for the 5
th quantile to 0.61 for
the 95
th quantile. The size of the firm enters significantly with a positive coefficient at
the lowest quantiles, but changes sign as we move up the conditional distribution of
leverage.  The  operating  profit  margin  enters  with  a  negative  and  statistically
significant coefficient at the 90
th and 95
th quantiles while it is not significant at lower
quantiles. The only difference from our previous results is the GROWTH variable,
which is now insignificant in all the quantiles considered.
                                                   
19  We obtain very similar results for the ratio of total debt to capital. The results (not reported here) are
available from authors upon request.17
6. Conclusions
This paper analyzes capital structure in South Korea from 1991 until 1999. This issue
has attracted considerable interest in the literature, in the light of the large observed
increase in the average debt ratios of South Korean corporations. The paper makes use
of conditional quantile regression methods to explore the changing distribution of debt
ratios across firms and over time.
We find clear evidence of heterogeneity in the capital structure of firms. The large
increase in the average debt ratios since 1997 is entirely attributable to the companies
in the top decile of the distribution. Symmetrically, the decline in the average profit
margin in the same period can be traced to the companies in the lowest decile of the
firms according to their debt ratio.
There is also strong evidence of heterogeneity in the determinants of capital structure
choice. The size of the firm and its rate of growth have a positive impact on debt at
low values of the debt ratios, but a negative impact at high values of the ratios. By
contrast, the proportion of net fixed assets has a negligible impact at low values of the
debt ratios, but a significantly positive impact at medium or high values of the ratios.
The empirical results of the paper are consistent with an agency-cost based theory of
capital structure, and with the presence of both a non-negativity constraint and an
upper bound on the debt ratio of individual firms. The theoretical model developed in
the paper is able to account for the observed non-linearities in capital structure
behavior in South Korean firms.
These results have significant implications for the post 1997 policy-led corporate
restructuring in Korea. Insofar as restructuring is designed to reduce leverage ratios,
our results demonstrate that the factors influencing the capital structure choices made
by highly leveraged firms have a different impact from those of less highly leveraged
firms. Therefore, well-designed policy should have a differentiated approach to
influencing capital structure.18
Data Appendix:
Short-term debt comprises borrowing repayable within 1 year (Item 309).
Long-term debt comprises loans repayable within 5 years, other long-term loans,
convertible loans and leasing finance (Item 321).
Total Debt equals to short-term plus long-term debt both measured in book value
(Item 1301).
Total capital employed comprises total share of capital and reserves, total loan capital,
total provisions and minority interests (Item 322). This corresponds to total assets
employed (Item 391).
Operating profit margin is the ratio of operating profits to total sales (Item 713).
Operating profits consists of net profit derived from the normal trading activities as
defined by the company.
Net fixed assets is total gross fixed assets (Item 330) minus total depreciation of fixed
assets  (Item  338). Gross fixed assets comprise total land and buildings, plant,
machinery and equipment, and other fixed assets (includes items that don’t fall into
the categories above and which are usually special to certain industries).
Total employees correspond to the number of employees in a firm (Item 219).19
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Table 1 – Features of firms in the 95
th quantile of the short-term debt-capital
distribution, compared with the rest of the sample.
 
Firms in 95th quantile
(Means, 1997)
Rest of firms
(Means, 1997)
Total Employees 1098 1576
Total Capital Employed 8.27×  10
7 4.56×  10
8
Net Fixed Assets 1.50×  10
8 3.18×  10
8
Operating Profit Margin -4.78 4.53
Return on Capital Employed -13.421 4.02
Proportion of short term Debt 0.43 0.35
Number of Observations 30 565-569
Table 2 – Features of firms in the 90
th quantile of the short-term debt-capital
distribution, compared with the rest of the sample.
 
Firms in 90th quantile
(Means)
Rest of firms
(Means)
Total Employees 1349 1574
Total Capital Employed 1.91×  10
8 4.65×  10
8
Net Fixed Assets 2.07×  10
8 2.07×  10
8
Operating Profit Margin -2.67 4.82
Return on Capital Employed -7.65 4.35
Proportion of short term Debt 0.43 0.35
Number of Observations 60 535-53922
Table 3: Ratio of short-term debt to capital employed: regression results.
SIZEt-1
2 NFAt-1
2 GROWTHt
2 OPMt-1
2 CONS
F-test for TIME
dummies
3
F-test for IND
dummies
4
OLS
-0.046
(0.040)
0.190
(0.008)
-0.107
(0.060)
-0.175
(0.556)
1.246
(0.716)
F-test= 2.62
p-value=0.01
F-test=4.37
p-value =0.00
5
0.019
(0.004)
0.012
(0.044)
0.025
(0.018)
0.063
(0.052)
-0.032
(0.156)
F-test= 50.76
p-value=0.00
F-test=154.87
p-value =0.00
10
0.017
(0.004)
0.059
(0.067)
0.036
(0.013)
0.040
(0.054)
-0.015
(0.138)
F-test= 141.20
p-value =0.00
F-test=154.87
p-value =0.00
25
0.009
(0.007)
0.192
(0.058)
0.030
(0.015)
0.078
(0.059)
0.118
(0.204)
F-test= 173.51
p-value =0.00
F-test=160.04
p-value =0.00
50
0.003
(0.009)
0.191
(0.042)
0.024
(0.010)
0.070
(0.041)
0.291
(0.235)
F-test= 97.63
p-value =0.00
F-test=60.42
p-value =0.00
75
-0.020
(0.013)
0.190
(0.109)
0.012
(0.020)
0.073
(0.113)
0.780
(0.305)
F-test= 88.94
p-value =0.00
F-test=183.05
p-value =0.00
90
-0.060
(0.017)
0.519
(0.216)
-0.013
(0.034)
-0.395
(0.292)
2.012*
(0.783)
F-test= 127.40
p-value =0.00
F-test=96.24
p-value =0.00
95
-0.083
(0.027)
0.640
(0.253)
-0.042
(0.054)
-1.059
(0.563)
2.465
(0.844)
F-test= 50.10
p-value =0.00
F-test=156.21
p-value =0.00
Notes:
1  The dependent variable is the ratio of short-term debt to total capital employed at time t. Bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses (except for the OLS equation). The bootstrap standard errors were obtained
using 1000 replications. The estimation period is 1992-1999.
2  Size denotes the logarithm of total capital employed, NFA denotes the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets,
OPM denotes the ratio of operating profits to total sales, GROWTH is the percentage change of sales year
over year and CONS is the intercept. All explanatory variables except GROWTH are lagged once.
3  F-test for joint significance of time dummies.
4  F-test for the joint significance of industry dummies.
Table 4: Short Debt-Capital Ratio: Tests for Equality of Coefficients Across Quantiles
  5 10 25 50 75 90
5
10
F-test=0.86
p-val=0.48
25
F-test=4.58
p-val=0.00
F-test=2.03
p-val=0.08
50
F-test=4.64
p-val=0.00
F-test=2.50
p-val=0.04
F-test=0.73
p-val=0.56
75
F-test=4.87
p-val=0.00
F-test=6.17
p-val=0.00
F-test=4.52
p-val=0.00
F-test=3.79
p-val=0.00
90
F-test=14.45
p-val=0.00
F-test=13.34
p-val=0.00
F-test=10.49
p-val=0.00
F-test=10.05
p-val=0.00
F-test=8.26
p-val=0.00
95
F-test=11.20
p-val=0.00
F-test=11.88
p-val=0.00
F-test=9.64
p-val=0.00
F-test=11.48
p-val=0.00
 F-test=9.79
p-val=0.00
F-test=1.84
p-val=0.1174 
Notes: This table presents F-tests of equality of the slope coefficients (SIZE, NFA, OPM, and GROWTH) across
quantiles, controlling for time and industry dummies and corresponding to table 3. The F-tests for equality of slope
coefficients and the corresponding p-values are based on the bootstrap method. All bootstrap simulations are based
on 200 replications.23
Table 5: Ratio of total debt to capital employed: regression results.
SIZEt-1
2 NFAt-1
2 GROWTHt
2 OPMt-1
2 CONS
F-test for TIME
dummies
3
F-test for IND
dummies
4
OLS
-0.012
(0.066)
0.248
(0.009) -0.241 (0.125)
-2.90
(1.956)
1.278
(1.214)
5.64
p-value=0.00
1.11
p-value=0.356
5
0.055
(0.009)
0.052
(0.092)
0.027
(0.019)
-0.020
(0.099)
-0.264
(0.312)
29.48
p-value=0.00
74.99
p-value=0.00
10
0.046
(0.012)
0.219
(0.097)
0.040
(0.023)
0.024
(0.086)
-0.225
(0.351)
123.46
p-value=0.00
114.15
p-value=0.00
25
0.065
(0.015)
0.253
(0.080)
0.032
(0.020)
-0.023
(0.112)
-0.534
(0.388)
78.84
p-value=0.00
63.30
p-value=0.00
50
0.056
(0.015)
0.252
(0.072)
0.0191
(0.024)
-0.204
(0.122)
-0.299
(0.395)
165.30
p-value=0.00
77.69
p-value=0.00
75
0.024
(0.018)
0.250
(0.135)
0.0003
(0.031)
-0.639
(0.250)
0.402
(0.445)
39.07
p-value=0.00
48.14
p-value=0.00
90
-0.015
(0.027)
0.535
(0.253)
-0.033
(0.060)
-1.827
(0.468)
1.583
(0.876)
76.80
p-value=0.00
45.31
p-value=0.00
95
-0.035
(0.046)
0.733
(0.245)
-0.076
(0.111)
-3.775
(0.870)
1.923
(1.164)
72.94
p-value=0.00
66.03
p-value=0.00
Notes:
1  The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to total capital employed at time t. Bootstrapped standard
errors in parentheses (except for the OLS equation). The bootstrap standard errors were obtained using 1000
replications. The estimation period is 1992-1999.
2  Size denotes the logarithm of total capital employed, NFA denotes the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets,
OPM denotes the ratio of operating profits to total sales, GROWTH is the percentage change of sales year
over year and CONS is the intercept. All explanatory variables except GROWTH are lagged once.
3  F-test for joint significance of time dummies.
4  F-test for the joint significance of industry dummies.
5  White standard errors for OLS results.
Table 6: Debt-Capital Ratio: Tests for Equality of Coefficients Across Quantiles
  5 10 25 50 75 90
5
10
F-test=1.94
p-val=0.10
25
F-test=3.97
p-val=0.00
F-test=3.03
p-val=0.01
50
F-test=2.20
p-val=0.06
F-test=1.62
p-val=0.16
F-test=1.53
p-val=0.19
75
F-test=3.64
p-val=0.00
F-test=3.40
p-val=0.00
F-test=9.20
p-val=0.00
F-test=6.19
p-val=0.00
90
F-test=7.97
p-val=0.00
F-test=6.52
p-val=0.00
F-test=8.31
p-val=0.00
F-test=8.36
p-val=0.00
F-test=4.90
p-val=0.00
95
F-test=9.92
p-val=0.00
F-test=8.12
p-val=0.00
F-test=11.06
p-val=0.00
F-test=11.03
p-val=0.00
 F-test=8.44
p-val=0.00
F-test=2.76
p-val=0.02 
Notes: This table presents F-tests of equality of the slope coefficients (SIZE, NFA, OPM, and GROWTH) across
quantiles, controlling for time and industry dummies and corresponding to table 5. The F-tests for equality of slope
coefficients and the corresponding p-values are based on the bootstrap method. All bootstrap simulations are based
on 200 replications.24
Table 7- Ratio of short-term debt to capital employed: regression results (1992-1997)
SIZEt-1
2 NFAt-1
2 GROWTHt
2 OPMt-1
2
OLS
-0.020
(0.014)
0.460
(0.083)
-0.025
(0.033)
-0.113
(0.381)
5
0.021
(0.004)
0.073
(0.029)
-0.001
(0.023)
0.058
(0.079)
10
0.018
(0.005)
0.120
(0.030)
0.035
(0.022)
0.103
(0.097)
25
0.011
(0.006)
0.202
(0.029)
0.031
(0.022)
0.143
(0.136)
50
0.000
(0.005)
0.301
(0.031)
0.023
(0.023)
0.135
(0.132)
75
-0.026
(0.014)
0.382
(0.055)
0.008
(0.029)
-0.239
(0.247)
90
-0.067
(0.015)
0.588
(0.068)
-0.022
(0.056)
-0.885
(0.494)
95
-0.084
(0.018)
0.613
(0.100)
-0.052
(0.077)
-1.54
(0.514)
Notes:
1  The dependent variable is the ratio of short-term debt to total capital employed at time t. Bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses (except for the OLS equation). The bootstrap standard errors were obtained
using 1000 replications. The estimation period is 1992-1997. Number of observations is 3096.
2  Size denotes the logarithm of total capital employed, NFA denotes the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets,
OPM denotes the ratio of operating profits to total sales and GROWTH is the percentage change of sales year
over year. All explanatory variables except GROWTH are lagged once.
3  F-tests (not reported here) suggest that both the industry dummies and time dummies are significant in
explaining the capital structure choice of firms. The results are available upon request. 
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Fig 2-Ratio of Short-Term Debt to Total Capital
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Fig 3- Operating Profit Margin
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Figure 4a- Short-term debt: estimated coefficient of SIZE
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Figure 4b-Short-term debt: estimated coefficient of NFA
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Figure 4c-Short-term debt:estimated coefficient of GROWTH
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
5 1 02 55 07 59 09 5
Quantiles
C
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
Figure 4d-Short-term debt: estimated coefficient of OPM
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Figure 5a- Total debt: estimated coefficients of SIZE
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Figure 5c-Total debt: estimated coefficient of GROWTH
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Figure 5b-Total debt: estimated coefficient of NFA
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Fig 5d-Total debt: estimated coefficient of OPM
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